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Queer Brinksmanship:
Citizenship and the Solomon Wars
In 1994, Congress passed a law commonly known as the Solomon
Amendment, threatening universities and law schools with loss of federal
funding if they deny or effectively prevent military recruiters from
accessing campuses and directory information about students.' It was the
opening salvo in what has become a voluble expressive battle between the
military and law schools. This fall, under cover of war, the Department of
Defense (DoD) 2 attempted to bring a decisive end to the conflict. Helping
themselves to millions of dollars of ammunition from the coffers of their
fellow agencies-with ambiguous authority at best-the military
successfully forced Judge Advocate General (JAG) recruiters onto
campuses around the country, upending carefully wrought compromises in
favor of a show of force. This Comment takes this queer brinksmanship as
its subject.
3
There are numerous ways to criticize both the Solomon Amendment
and the recent DoD enforcement campaign. It appears, for example, that the
1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558, 108
Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549(b)(1), 113 Stat. 512, 611 (1999).
2. I use the DoD as shorthand for the source of the policy, because it is they who enforce it,
but it is worth noting that the policy-like "don't ask, don't tell" itself-may well have originated
not with the military but with members of Congress and/or the current Administration.
3. The "brinksmanship" claim is plain: The military is using millions of dollars in federal
funding to set up a game of chicken/hawk with universities. The term "queer" may be less self-
evident. Derived from the Latin "to twist," as used by quee- theorists, "queer" is both a noun
(marking people engaged in sexual crossings) and an adjective (marking relations of strangeness
or transition). See EVE SEDGWICK, Foreword: T Times, in TENDENCIES, at xi, xi-xii (1993). The
"queer" part of "queer brinksmanship" thus connotes two things: that this conflict is about
"queers" and that the military's brinksmanship is itself "queer" (which is to say, highly mutable
and poised to backfire).
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DoD is operating in violation of its own regulations,4 and relying upon
statutory interpretations that raise serious constitutional questions under the
Spending Clause. 5 There are also potential First Amendment problems with
the Solomon Amendment, particularly because of the special zone of
speech protection that universities enjoy.6 From a pragmatic point of view,
Solomon and the recent escalation look like colossal cognitive error. By
refusing to hire openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, and by
adopting tactics that generate protests and ethical dilemmas for potential
recruits, the military sharply undermines its own recruiting efforts.
7
This Comment contends, however, that we cannot measure Solomon's
success or failure against its pragmatic impact on military recruiting,
because Solomon is not and has never been about effective military
recruiting. Rather, Solomon and its recent enforcement are maneuvers in an
expressive battle, fought over the role that homosexuals play in a
community, the purpose of the modem university, and the meaning of good
citizenship. But if Solomon is a symbolic conflict, who is winning? This
Comment suggests a surprising possibility: The military may be serving the
cause of homosexuals by calling attention to its discriminatory policies in
their most transparently homophobic context (the JAG Corps). The military
also may have done universities a favor by returning them to their heritage
of dissent: Forced to relinquish the accommodations upon which they relied
to manage the conflict, universities and law schools now have little choice
but simply to confront it. Finally, I suggest that those of us dedicated to
nondiscrimination principles that include sexual orientation should
4. Current regulations specifically provide that the funds of a parent university will not be
withdrawn if a law school is deemed noncompliant. 32 C.F.R. § 216.3(b)(1) (2002). When
recruiters threaten universities with funding cutoffs because of the acts of their law schools, they
appear to violate a basic principle of regulatory estoppel: Agencies must follow their own rules
when those rules have "the force of law." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974). The
DoD may contend that the consolidated Solomon Amendment, passed in 1999, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 549, supercedes the regulations. It is far from self-
evident, however, that the 1999 Act requires the DoD to penalize an entire university for the acts
of a law school. If the Act did, it would raise serious questions under the Spending Clause. See
infra note 5. Courts must reject agency interpretations if they raise serious constitutional
questions. See. e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995). Thus, the DoD's recent threats
appear to be unauthorized by either regulation or statute.
5. The Court has suggested that to qualify as a valid condition on a spending measure, the
Solomon Amendment must be related to the federal interest at stake in the spending measure.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The condition in question-access for military
recruiters bears no rational relationship to the expenditures in question (as interpreted by the
DoD), which include funding for cancer and AIDS research. Even knottier questions ensue: Is it
problematic that the DoD has been granted unilateral authority to cancel contracts made by fellow
agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health?
6. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
7. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspend "'Don't Ask, Don't Tell," HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 13,
2002, at CI; see also Rebecca Trounson, Law Schools Bow to Pentagon on Recruiters, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, § 2, at I (noting that faculty members and students at law schools believe
that the military has scared away potential recruits).
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welcome this opportunity for engagement-but also think seriously about
what it would mean to win, and what we are willing to risk to do so.
I
Since its inception, the Solomon Amendment has been a weapon in a
fully symbolic battle. Smoking guns abound. For one thing, the first version
of the Amendment was effectively redundant as a matter of law. A statute
passed during the Vietnam War era already granted the DoD the power to
withdraw their funding from universities that obstructed on-campus military
recruitment. 8 If Solomon was not intended to change the law, what was it
intended to do? According to one of its proponents, it was meant to "send a
message over the wall of the ivory tower of higher education." 9 U.S. law
schools were one key addressee, because they had been banning military
recruiters-along with other employers that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation-since 1978.10 In fact, it seems that the Amendment was
a direct response to a court decision in Congressman Solomon's state that
required state university law schools to ban JAG recruiters from campus."
The first version of Solomon had little effect, because law schools
receive little if any DoD funding. 12 In 1996, Congress expanded the funds
threatened by Solomon, 3 implicating federal student aid and dramatically
increasing the stakes for law schools. 14 Some schools stood their ground
and accepted the financial losses.' 5 Others, facing six-digit penalties,
conceded.16 Many other schools chose a middle road, crafting narrow
accommodations with the military, styling themselves as compliant-but. .. .. 17
barely-so as to avoid penalties without admitting expressive defeat.
8. Act of Sept. 26, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606(a), 86 Stat. 734, 740 (1973) (denying
DoD funds to any institution of higher learning that denied military recruiters access to the
campus, unless the funds were being used for research that the Secretary of Defense considered
important for national defense).
9. 140 CONG. REC. 11,441 (1994) (statement of Rep. Pombo).
10. Memorandum from Dean Richard Revesz to the NYU Law School Community (Sept. 12,
2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from Dean Revesz] (on file with author).
11. The legislative history of the Solomon Amendment contains extensive reference to the
New York lawsuit. 140 CONG. REc. 11,439 (1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon); id. at l1,442
(statement of Rep. Engel). The case is Doe v. Rosa, 606 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
12. Frank Valdes, Solomon's Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 T. MARSHALL. L.
REv. 351, 354 (1998).
13. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 514, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-270 (1996), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549(b)(2), 113 Stat. 512,611 (1999).
14. Funds received by some ninety percent of law schools were now threatened. Deborah L.
Rhode, Solomon Amendments Curb Academic Freedom, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A21.
15. One example was NYU Law School. Memorandum from Dean Revesz, supra note 10.
16. One example was Duke Law School. Pamela B. Gann, No-Win Amendment Traps Law
Schools, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13, 1997, at A23.
17. Harvard Law School, for example, banned Air Force recruiters from their official
interview program, but successfully argued that they were in compliance with Solomon because
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In 1999, Congress took student aid out of the Solomon equation, 18 and
repassed the Amendment in consolidated form.19 Although Congress was
arguably signaling a desire to defuse the Solomon conflict, in 2000, the
DoD did exactly the opposite. For the first time, they began to threaten
noncompliant law schools not only with loss of their own funding, but with
the loss of their entire university's funding. In the wake of September 11 th,
the DoD directly took on law schools like Harvard and Yale, issuing $350
million threats and declaring accommodations that had been accepted for
20years to be now noncompliant. Offering schools no opportunity to contest
determinations of noncompliance before funding was cut off, the military
successfully forced law schools like USC,2' Harvard,22 Yale, 23 and
Columbia 24 to comply with their demands.
The accommodations the military demanded were in many cases both
petty and detrimental to recruiting, providing further evidence that the
conflict is first and foremost symbolic. Since 1997, for example, USC Law
School had allowed JAG recruiters to interview on campus, treating them
like all other employers in every way but one: The military was asked to
interview in a convenient, but separate, location.25 In the ensuing years, the
number of USC graduates hired by the military increased, and military
recruiters repeatedly agreed that the accommodation worked well.26 In May
2002, USC was informed that the DoD now deemed this arrangement to be
noncompliant. Recruiters insisted that they wanted to be treated "the same
as any other employer"--not, that is, subject to the nondiscrimination
requirement, but rather allowed to interview in the main building. 27 The
military offered no evidence that recruiting had been unsuccessful under the
old accommodation, and it was undeterred by the notion that its presence in
the official building would spark protests that had been avoided so far.
JAG was allowed to recruit on campus and was regularly invited to do so by a student
organization. Press Release, Harvard Law School, Dean Robert C. Clark Announces Change to
HLS Military Recruiting Policy (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/
2002/08/26 military.html.
18. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8120, 113 Stat.
1212, 1260 (1999).
19. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 106-65, § 549, 113
Stat. 512, 609 (1999).
20. Press Release, supra note 17; Memorandum from Dean Anthony Kronman to the Yale
Law School Community (Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
21. Trounson, supra note 7.
22. Harvard Law School Bows to U.S. and Allows Military Recruiters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2002, at A12.
23. Yale Will Allow Military at Law School Career Day, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2002, at A15.
24. Karen W. Arenson, Military Recruiters Are Allowed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at B1.
25. Open Letter from Dean Matthew L. Spitzer to the USC Law School Community (Aug.
19, 2002) [hereinafter USC Open Letter] (on file with author); see also Trounson, supra note 7
(citing a student who suggested that the special location was in fact more convenient).
26. USC Open Letter, supra note 25.
27. Id.
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According to Dean Matthew Spitzer, the military simply was not influenced
by the data about recruiting.
28
It is hard to see such demands as anything but maneuvers in an
ideological battle. Universities, of course, are also waging a symbolic war.
How else can we understand the tremendous effort that they put into
constructing and defending accommodations that do not practically obstruct
recruiting-indeed, that arguably help the military to recruit effectively on
campus? Law schools have clung to their accommodations not because they
obstruct recruiting, but because they have salutary expressive effects: They
mark the military as a discriminatory institution, and they allow law schools
to feel that they are defending their communities and principles.
What, though, are those principles-what is this symbolic conflict
about? In part, it concerns the role that homosexuality plays in a
community. 29 "Don't ask, don't tell" (DADT) is predicated on the idea that
self-avowed homosexuality is fundamentally incompatible with military
community, and with the particularly honored kind of citizenship that we
associate with military service. It presumes that "open" homosexuals
threaten (heterosexual) community and call forth discriminatory and violent
impulses in their comrades. 30 Law schools' nondiscrimination policies, in
contrast, are premised on the idea that discrimination, not homosexuality,
disrupts and causes offense to a community.
Another way to style this conflict is as an argument over what it means
to be a good citizen, and whether or not homosexuality is compatible with
that citizenship. It is commonplace to view the military as a privileged site
for the articulation of what it means to be a virtuous citizen. 31 Education is
another such site. In fact, as Brown v. Board of Education suggested, it may
have become an even more important crucible for modem citizenship than
the military, because today education "is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the arrnedforces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship.
' '3 2
28. Id.
29. Part of what marks Solomon as an expressive conflict about homosexuality is the fact that
it could be, but never has been, the source of a conflict over the military's discriminatory policies
regarding sex and disability.
30. See JuDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 103-26 (1997); Kendall Thomas,
Shower/Closet, 20 ASSEMBLAGE 80, 80 (1993).
31. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 499 (1991). The right to serve in the military is often characterized
as a political right akin to the right to vote. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-Foreword. The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 128 (2000)
(suggesting that within the Bill of Rights, military service and voting are "paired political rights").
Like the jury, the military is seen as a foundational democratic institution, because it fosters good
citizenship. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132
(1991) (arguing that the Bill of Rights protects "various intermediate associations-church,
militia, and jury-designed to create an educated and virtuous electorate").
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
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Brown was concerned with primary and secondary school education,
but the university has a similar, although more indirect, role in forging
modem notions of citizenship.33 As the founder of the modem university,
Wilhelm von Humboldt, understood them, universities should have
"indirect utility [and] direct uselessness for the state. 34 Humboldt and the
German idealists thought universities fulfilled this mandate by producing
"not servants but subjects" of the state,35 and by serving "as the site of
critique." 36 By rejecting employers who discriminate on grounds of sexual
orientation-indeed, by rejecting the military as one of those employers-
universities are serving precisely the function that we want them to serve.
Universities are fundamental to our democracy, because they provide space
for the articulation of critique and the development of alternative modes of
citizenship. Thus, we ought to be concerned when expression at universities
is curtailed in favor of expression on behalf of the state.
This sensibility, of course, is the foundation of the special speech
protection that universities enjoy.37 If the Solomon conflict is at its heart a
symbolic one, and if the recent enforcement bears no rational relationship to
the government's interest in recruiting, the conflict seems to raise serious
First Amendment questions. 38 But as commentators like Lawrence Lessig
have pointed out, the more likely a law is to violate the First Amendment,
the more likely it is also to be self-defeating.39 Solomon, I suggest, may be
an unexpected example of this paradox.
33. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, universities are "vital centers for the Nation's
intellectual life" that operate "at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition."
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995).
34. BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUrNS 124 (1996).
35. Id. at 67 (discussing the views ofFriedrich Schleiermacher).
36. Id. at 6.
37. The Court has "long recognized the constitutional importance of academic freedom," Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 n.3 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted), and recently affirmed that universities enjoy special constitutional
protection from spending measures that impact their speech rights, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
200 (1991) (noting that universities are "a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere
by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment" (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S 589, 603, 605-06 (1967)).
38. For example, is the recent enforcement of Solomon so unlikely to further the government
interest unrelated to the expression of speech (recruiting), or so excessively burdensome upon
universities' expression, that it fails under the O'Brien test? United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968).
39. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1041-
42 (1995).




Have law schools lost the battle-and who will win the war? The
military has successfully inserted its recruiters into interview programs
around the country, but it is far from clear that it has done its recruiters any
favors. But if the point is not recruiting, but rather expression-as I have
argued-is the military likely to make its point (roughly, consolidating the
military as fully heterosexual and putting universities in their place)? Not
necessarily. Consider the deep liabilities that its current position carries:
The military can hardly occupy the high ground of patriotism and unity if it
is seen as using the cover of war to further discriminatory and divisive ends.
It is also entirely unclear how the military would defend DADT as applied
to JAG, if it were pressed on the issue. As a last resort, it can appeal to
homophobia itself, but the more DADT appears to be rooted in "a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," the less likely it is to
satisfy equal protection standards. 40 Finally, the military has chosen a
weapon it must desperately wish not to use. To threaten funding for cancer
and bioterrorism research is to use a human shield-not something that the
good soldier is supposed to do, regardless of the rationale.
For their part, faced with choices that can only be called Solomonic,
law schools ceded to almost every recruiting demand. According to
newspaper headlines, this was clear defeat.4 1 When compared to the
mobilization that surrounded them, however, the concessions made seem
inconsequential. Students and faculty protested,42 and deans expressed
solidarity with gay, lesbian, and bisexual students. 43 Some schools-like
Yale-announced that they will pursue legal vindication, contending that
their previous policies complied with the Solomon Amendment.
44
Where does this leave the expressive battle? Here is one ironic reading:
The military, by forcing the issue, has broken the silence that typifies their
approach to homosexuality in the armed forces, and thus has acted in the
interests of gay rights campaigners. They may have also helped return
universities to their rightful heritage as institutions committed to critique by
pressing them to concede or defend their principles. We might say that
40. United States Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Harvard Law School Bows to U.S. and Allows Military Recruiters, supra note
22; Trounson, supra note 7.
42. See, e.g., Students Protest Pentagon Recruiters; Military Ban on Gays Conflicts with
Georgetown's Antidiscrimination Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at B2.
43. Id.; see also Memorandum from Dean Richard Revesz to the NYU Law School
Community, supra note 10.
44. Trounson, supra note 7. However, the McCain Amendment, Defense Department
Appropriations Act Fiscal Year 2003, S. 2514, 107th Cong. (2002), waits in the wings, prepared
to remove nearly all of the flexibility upon which law schools rely to defend their
accommodations. Constitutional challenges to the McCain Amendment could, of course, be
levied. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 38.
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universities were playing their own version of "don't ask, don't tell" by
(understandably-even laudably) attempting to avoid the Solomonic
choices put to them, accommodating recruiters while scoring a (local)
expressive point against the military. Pressed to the wall and denied access
to the markers of resistance upon which they had relied previously, law
schools have been forced to confront their commitment to the principles at
stake. The response has been seismic: Coalitions have sprung up within and
across law schools, dedicating themselves to making not local but national
points about the Solomon Amendment-and not only about Solomon, but
also about DADT itself. It is possible, then, that the military is headed the
way of the Boy Scouts, poised to fall victim to its own success.
45
III
Important questions, of course, remain: What would it mean to "win"
this symbolic battle for any of those implicated by it, including the military;
law schools; and gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals? What ought
students, faculty, and school administrators be doing with the discursive
opening offered by the military's queer brinksmanship? Should universities
seek the narrowest possible compliance with Solomon, e.g., by bringing
lawsuits defending their right to relegate the military to separate buildings?
(What does that express, and to whom?) Should they band together and call
the military's bluff? Should they concede the practical matter and allow the
military to recruit, but wage a more aggressive expressive campaign? That
is, rather than insist that they are "committed to complying with the law, 46
should universities announce that they are complying with Solomon only
under overwhelming duress, and that they believe DADT to be a violently
discriminatory policy? Should they oppose Solomon in the name of
generally palatable values like "nondiscrimination," or should they use this
as an opportunity to express public solidarity with gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals specifically? The latter course no doubt would
occasion painful consequences for some schools (particularly those with
antigay alumni and donors)-but might such painful consequences be in
some way expressively important? If we complicate our understanding of
what the Solomon Amendment is, and what it would mean to comply with
or resist it, we can begin to ask questions such as these. Answers may be
hard to come by, but there is no better time, or place, to begin to ask them.
-Amy Kapczynski
45. Much has been made of the dramatic decline in support for the Boy Scouts of America
following their victory in the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000). See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Scouts' Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al.
46. Yale Will Allow Military at Law School Career Day, supra note 23.
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